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INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) may be
the most controversial piece of legislation of the past several
decades.1 The purpose of the PPACA is to provide access to afford-
able health care for all Americans, to improve efficiency in the
health care industry, and to contain rising costs of health
insurance.2 Although increasing access to health care and other
similar goals of the Act are not controversial,3 the PPACA’s methods
of achieving these goals have created deep rifts within America’s
political parties.4 
The controversial nature of the PPACA garnered a constitutional
challenge before the Supreme Court in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius.5 In the majority opinion written
by Chief Justice Roberts,6 the Court upheld the individual mandate
under Congress’s power to tax,7 but struck down the provision to
1. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010). Compare Ron Pollack, Striking Down the Affordable Care Act Would Be
Unconscionable, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/debate-
club/should-the-supreme-court-overturn-obamas-healthcare-law/striking-down-the-affordable-
care-act-would-be-unconscionable (attacking any future decision to overturn the PPACA), with
Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Affordable Care Act Gives Government Permission to Play the
Bully, FOX NEWS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/08/01/affordable-care-
act-gives-government-permission-to-play-bully/ (calling for support against the PPACA).
2. See DEMOCRATIC POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: DETAILED SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at http://dpc.
senate.gov/healthreformbill/healthbill04.pdf.
3. See Patricia Zengerle, Most Americans Oppose Health Law but Like Provisions,
REUTERS (June 24, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/24/us-usa-campaign-
healthcare-idUSBRE85N01M20120624; see also Ezra Klein, Poll: Republicans Hate
‘Obamacare,’ but Like Most of What It Does, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (June 26, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/06/26/poll-republicans-hate-
obamacare-but-like-most-of-what-it-does/. 
4. See Tom Cohen, Republicans Launch Blitz Against Health Care Law, CNN.COM (June
29, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/29/politics/health-care/index.html; Lydia Saad,
Americans Issue Split Decision on Healthcare Ruling, GALLUP POL. (June 29, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155447/americans-issue-split-decision-healthcare-ruling.aspx.
5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
6. See Saad, supra note 4.
7. The individual mandate requires people to either purchase insurance or pay a penalty.
To clarify, the individual mandate and the federal medical loss ratio are different provisions
of the PPACA. The Court’s choice to limit Congress’s commerce power was not applied to the
federal medical loss ratio. See The Requirement to Buy Coverage Under the Affordable Care
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expand Medicaid because Congress could not order states to
regulate in a precise manner.8 Not all of the PPACA’s legal contro-
versies were brought before the Court in this landmark case.9 In
particular, the Court did not address the PPACA’s requirement that
health insurance companies provide rebates to customers if they fail
to meet a specified federal medical loss ratio.10
A medical loss ratio is “[t]he percentage of your premium dollars
that an insurance company spends on providing you with health
care and improving the quality of your care (as opposed to what it
spends on administrative, overhead, [profits,] and marketing
costs).”11 Under the PPACA, insurers must issue rebates if pay-
ments for medical claims and quality improvement activities
account for less than 85% of premium revenue for insurers in a
large group market or less than 80% for insurers in a small group
or individual market.12 These requirements of 80% and 85% are the
federal government’s minimum medical loss ratios. The federal
government now limits how much insurance companies may spend
of each premium dollar on expenses that are not medical expenses
or efforts to improve quality.13 The rebate amount is equal to the
amount by which the insurance company’s expenditures on
nonmedical and nonquality improvement costs exceed the minimum
medical loss ratio of total premium dollars.14
Medical loss ratios are not a new concept in governance. States
have implemented minimum medical loss ratios for years to rein in
Act, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 9, 2011), http://healthreform.kff.org/the-
basics/requirement-to-buy-coverage-flowchart.aspx. 
8. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2608. 
9. The individual mandate and Medicaid expansion were the primary issues brought
before the Court. Other legal issues, though, such as the federal medical loss ratio, were
mentioned in briefs. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text (addressing briefs filed in
National Federation).
10. See generally Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
11. Value for Your Premium Dollar, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.health
care.gov/law/features/costs/value-for-premium/index.html; see Explaining Health Care Reform:
Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Feb. 2012), http://www.
kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform-medical-loss-ratio-mlr/.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b) (Supp. 2012).
13. See Value for Your Premium Dollar, supra note 11.
14. See id.
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rising health care costs.15 However, states almost always set more
lenient minimum medical loss ratios than the new federal ratio.
Today, thirty-eight states have medical loss ratios below 75% or no
medical loss ratios at all.16 In fact, only California, New York, and
Vermont have medical loss ratios that meet or exceed the new
federal ratio of 80% for small group or individual carriers.17 No state
has a medical loss ratio that meets the federal medical loss ratio of
85% for large group carriers.18 Congress only gave states the option
of increasing their medical loss ratios above the federal minimum.19
State regulation decreasing the medical loss ratio is subject to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services’ approval.20 States may
apply for an adjustment if the federal “standard may destabilize the
individual market” and “result in fewer choices for consumers.”21
The decision to set a medical loss ratio is now reserved solely for the
federal government, not for the states.
This Note evaluates the constitutional and statutory viability of
the PPACA’s insurance rebate provision, specifically the federal
medical loss ratio. The federal medical loss ratio has received some
scholarly attention with respect to its constitutionality. Professor
Richard Epstein and practitioner Paula Stannard contend that the
ratio is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause because the government has not compensated for regulatory
losses after it reduced the health insurance industry’s return on
investment.22 Professor Epstein also wrote another paper with a
15. See Medical Loss Ratios: Evidence from the States, FAMS. USA 3 (June 2008),
http://familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/medical-loss-ratio.pdf (showing that approximately one-third
of states set medical loss ratios and that nine of these states have ratios below 75%).
16. See id.
17. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.78 (2011); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3231 (McKinney 2011); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4080 (West 2011).
18. See Medical Loss Ratios: Evidence from the States, supra note 15, at 3.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b) (Supp. 2012) (providing states the option to set a higher
medical loss ratio, but not providing an option of a lower medical loss ratio).
20. See § 300gg-18(b), (d).
21. See State Requests for MLR Adjustment, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
ht tp : / / cms .gov/CCIIO/programs-and- ini t iat ives /Heal th-Insurance-Market -
Reforms/state_mlr_adj_requests.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
22. See Richard A. Epstein & Paula M. Stannard, Constitutional Ratemaking and the
Affordable Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 261-65 (2012).
Ms. Stannard is also the former deputy general counsel and former acting general counsel of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which is the department in charge of
346 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:341
similar argument prior to the PPACA’s passage, arguing that the
government’s failure to provide a risk-adjusted rate of return or any
due process to insurance companies was unconstitutional under the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings and Due Process Clauses.23 Judicial
clerk Wesley Markham responded to Professor Epstein’s concerns
by contending that the ratio may be constitutional because insur-
ance companies can still earn a reasonable profit.24 Despite this
scholarship, no examination of the medical loss ratio’s statutory
viability or constitutional viability under the Commerce Clause
exists to date. Considering that the Supreme Court could find the
federal medical loss ratio to be constitutional under any number of
avenues, as it surprisingly found the individual mandate constitu-
tional under the taxation power, it is of vital importance to examine
whether the medical loss ratio would be upheld under the federal
government’s insurance regulatory statute, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.
This Note argues that, although the codification of a federal
medical loss ratio may be constitutional under the Commerce
Clause, there is no federal statutory basis that permits Congress to
preempt state regulation of medical loss ratios. To provide a
framework for presenting this argument, the first Part of this Note
presents a summary of the PPACA’s general goals and resulting
litigation. The second Part discusses the history of insurance
regulation and its role in the state regulatory sphere. The third Part
explains how Congress has the authority to regulate insurance
companies’ medical loss ratios under the Commerce Clause. The
fourth Part demonstrates that although the federal medical loss
administering the federal medical loss ratio. 
23. See Richard A. Epstein, MANHATTAN INST., IMPERMISSIBLE RATEMAKING IN HEALTH-
INSURANCE REFORM: WHY THE REID BILL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, 19-23 (2009), http://www.
medicalprogresstoday.com/pdfs/MI_Health_Care_act.pdf. A student note by Rebecca Kopps
similarly argues that the federal medical loss ratio violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause because insurance companies cannot earn a competitive rate of return and did not
receive compensation for the forced loss. See Rebecca J. Kopps, Note, Dead on Arrival: The
Health Insurance Industry’s Bleak Prognosis Due to Unconstitutional Ratemaking in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 577, 610-11 (2011).
24. See Wesley D. Markham, Healthcare Reform’s Mandatory Medical Loss Ratio:
Constitutionality, Policy, and Implementation, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 139, 167-68 (2011) (admitting
that the PPACA does allow for occasional unconstitutional circumstances, however, such as
when a company sues and is able to prove that it must shut down due to the ratio).
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ratio may be constitutional under the Commerce Clause, it is not
statutorily permissible under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This
Note concludes by addressing the legal and policy implications of
allowing the federal medical loss ratio to continue to exist. 
I. THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
A. Processes and Goals of the PPACA and Its Medical Loss Ratio
President Obama signed the PPACA into law on March 23,
2010.25 Through over 900 pages of text,26 the Act “put[ ] in place
comprehensive reforms that improve access to affordable health
coverage for everyone and protect consumers from abusive insur-
ance company practices.”27 Congress established the federal medical
loss ratio and its resulting rebate requirement in order to advance
the goal of providing affordable health care to everyone.28 In fact,
the Democratic Policy and Communications Committee cited the
medical loss ratio as one of the PPACA’s immediate improvements,
which “[c]ap[ped] insurance company non-medical, administrative
expenditures.”29 
The new federal medical loss ratio requires health insurers
offering policies to individuals or small groups to spend at least 80%
of premiums on direct medical care and efforts to improve the
quality of care.30 Insurers selling to large groups of fifty or more
employees must spend 85% of premiums on care and quality
improvement.31 In order for the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to assess whether an insurance company must issue a
rebate, the PPACA requires insurers to submit data to calculate the
medical loss ratio. Specifically, insurance companies must provide
the percentage of premium revenues used to pay for “clinical
25. A More Secure Future: What the New Health Law Means for You and Your Family,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/healthreform/healthcare-overview (last visited
Sept. 22, 2013). See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
26. See 124 Stat. at 119-1025.
27. See A More Secure Future, supra note 25.
28. See DEMOCRATIC POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 1.
29. See id.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b) (Supp. 2012).
31. See id.
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services and quality improvement.”32 If an insurance company fails
to meet the required medical loss ratio, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services has mandated that the company send rebates to its
consumers.33 The rebate can be in the form of a check, a reduction
in premiums, or a lump sum reimbursement in the insured’s
account.34 Reporting by insurance companies began on June 1, 2012
and rebates were sent throughout the summer of 2012.35 
B. Litigation Surrounding the PPACA
Parties and amicus curiae mentioned the federal medical loss
ratio in briefs submitted in National Federation,36 but it was not an
issue raised before the Supreme Court.37 Eight federal courts have
ruled on other constitutional and statutory challenges to the
PPACA.38 Although some aspects of the resulting decisions are no
longer good law after the National Federation decision, they do show
an important trend of how the district and circuit courts rule on
challenges to PPACA provisions. 
District and circuit court trends appear to favor the constitution-
ality of federally imposed insurance laws. Five district and circuit
courts upheld various provisions of the PPACA, most frequently
reviewing challenges targeting the individual mandate.39 These
courts collectively stated that the PPACA provisions at issue were
created within the lawful power of the Commerce Clause,40 lacked
32. See Medical Loss Ratio, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.
gov/CCIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/Medical-Loss-
Ratio.html  (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
33. See id.
34. See Michael Hash, Finding Out if Your Health Insurer Is Providing Value for Your
Premiums, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE CONSUMERISM (July 13, 2012), http://www.theihcc.com/en/
communities/health_plans_managed_care/finding-out-if-your-health-insurer-is-providing-
va_h4pxm023.html.
35. See id.
36. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
37. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
38. See infra notes 39-46.
39. See id. The individual mandate is a separate provision from the federal medical loss
ratio. See supra note 7.
40. See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 33-34 (D.D.C.), aff’d sub nom. Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d
882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d 529, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l
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personal41 or subject matter jurisdiction42 to be challenged, and did
not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,43 Free Exercise
Clause, or Free Speech Clause.44 However, two district courts and
a circuit court found the PPACA’s individual mandate unconstitu-
tional.45 Both district courts and the circuit court held that Congress
usurped state power through an unconstitutional extension of the
Commerce Clause.46 
These cases show a trend that district and circuit courts generally
view the PPACA as constitutionally permissible, with limited
exceptions. The most important decision moving forward, however,
is the Supreme Court’s review of the PPACA in National Federation.
C. Review of the PPACA by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reviewed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
National Federation. The Eleventh Circuit held that the individual
mandate was unconstitutional because it exceeded congressional
authority to regulate interstate commerce.47 In a five-to-four
Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
41. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2011) (remanding
to dismiss), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012).
42. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir. 2011).
43. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Mo.
2012) (dismissing a PPACA challenge under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because
the requirement to provide contraception coverage for employees did not violate an employer’s
religious freedom); Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 41-43.
44. See Liberty, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618 (W.D. Va. 2010) (dismissing the case because the
PPACA did not violate the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise Clause, equal protection rights,
or the Commerce Clause), vacated, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679
(2012).
45. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1273-95 (N.D. Fla.) (offering one of the most detailed Commerce Clause analyses of the
PPACA decisions), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012);
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781-82 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding the
mandate unconstitutional because the PPACA did not cover commerce as intended by the
Constitution).
46. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that the mandate could be severed); Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d
at 781-82; Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
47. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1328 (holding that the mandate could be
severed as well).
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decision, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the individual
mandate was constitutional under Congress’s taxing power.48 
Although the mandate was constitutional under Congress’s taxing
power, a majority of the Court also held that the individual mandate
exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause.49 Chief
Justice Roberts and the joint dissent50 agreed that the Commerce
Clause could not justify Congress’s creation of the individual
mandate because it constituted a penalty against economic inactiv-
ity.51 This constraint limited future congressional authority
stemming from the Commerce Clause. The Court further held the
expansion of Medicaid unconstitutional because it coerced state
action, and thus severed it from the PPACA.52
The legal challenges in National Federation did not include
challenges to the federal medical loss ratio.53 Because the ratio was
not at issue, the Court’s rejection of Congress’s power to regulate the
individual mandate under the commerce power did not extend to the
ratio. However, thirteen amicus briefs discussed the ratio, with
several raising it as problematic to the health care insurance
industry.54 Notably, the amicus briefs finding fault with the federal
48. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. For a breakdown of the Justices’ votes, see Corey
Ciocchetti, The Constitution, The Roberts Court, and Business: The Significant Business
Impact of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court Term, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 385, 458 (2013).
49. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
50. See id. at 2642 (Alito, J., Kennedy, J., Scalia, J., Thomas, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 2590 (distinguishing from Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005)); id. at
2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 2608.
53. See generally id. (showing no discussion of the insurance rebate requirement).
54. See generally Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 10, Nat’l Fed’n,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398); Brief for Petitioners (Severability) at 18-19, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393, 11-400); Brief for Respondents (Severability) at 40, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393, 11-400); Brief for Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 33, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058); Brief of Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11,
Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393, 11-400); Brief of Constitutional Law and Economics
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-
398); Brief for Economists as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (No. 11-393, 11-400); Brief for HSA Coalition et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 19, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398); Brief of Jewish Alliance for Law
& Social Action et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 35, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (No. 11-398); Brief of Michigan Legal Services et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 8, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393, 11-400); Brief for the States of
California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566
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medical loss ratio generally attacked it for policy reasons and did
not cite direct legal challenges. 
The HSA Coalition’s brief, which relied on policy justifications in
lieu of legal justifications, argued exclusively against the federal
medical loss ratio and the rebate requirement. The brief quoted a
study by Milliman, Inc., which performed the only published
actuarial study of the federal medical loss ratio.55 Milliman found
that the “Act and its regulations have taken away an individual’s
choice in health insurance decisions, and is replacing it with a
limited, standardized array of government-approved options.”56 The
HSA Coalition argued that insurance companies with primarily
high deductible plans would suffer the most from the high minimum
medical loss ratio and may be forced to discontinue such plans due
to increased risk while sustaining lower profits.57 The Coalition
further argued that the federal medical loss ratio’s incentive to cut
administrative expenses “may create disincentives to offer such
lower-cost plans [such as high deductible plans], particularly if the
insurer cannot generate reasonable risk margins.”58 According to the
brief, medical loss ratios require lower profits from insurance
companies, which is too great of a burden for companies dealing
with high risk plans.59 
Two additional amicus briefs directly expressed disapproval of the
federal medical loss ratio. An amicus brief submitted by Virginia
Delegate Bob Marshall, among other legislative representatives and
research institutions, argued that the federal medical loss ratio
allowed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to manage “a
quintessential business decision previously left largely to private
insurance companies.”60 The brief argued that such management
would influence insurance companies to stop offering Health
(Nos. 11-393, 11-400); Brief for Texas Public Policy Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 37, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398); Brief
of Virginia Delegate Bob Marshall et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 34,
Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398). 
55. Brief for HSA Coalition et al., supra note 54, at 5.
56. See id. 
57. See id. at 19.
58. See id. at 19-20 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
59. Id.
60. See Brief of Virginia Delegate Bob Marshall at 34, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-
398). 
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Savings Accounts (HSA) that offer plans with high deductibles.61
This is because HSAs are generally used to supplement regular
insurance for uncovered treatments and would not count toward
medical payments included in a company’s medical loss ratio.62
Another amicus brief by the Texas Public Policy Foundation argued
that the PPACA was a misguided regulation and that the expansion
of federal power to establish a minimum medical loss ratio was not
within the Framers’ original intent.63 
Although thirteen amicus briefs mentioned the federal medical
loss ratio, including three arguing that the ratio is bad policy, most
of the briefs did not offer a strong position for or against the
provision. As a result, the Supreme Court has not, to date, ad-
dressed any legal challenges of the federal medical loss ratio. The
following Parts explore the historical role of Congress in insurance
regulation and whether the federal medical loss ratio is likely to be
constitutionally and statutorily permissible if the Supreme Court
accepts the issue for review. 
II. CONGRESS’S HISTORICAL ROLE IN INSURANCE REGULATION
States traditionally regulate minimum standards for insurance
companies and their practices.64 Standards vary across states, with
all states regulating fair claims handling practices65 and most
regulating access to health care.66 With the expansion of insurance
sales throughout the country over the past century, however, the
nature of regulation has changed. The historical path of health
insurance development helps explain the process for determining
whether the federal government may constitutionally and statuto-
rily preempt state medical loss ratios. This Part explains how
insurance regulation developed as a state issue through 1945, how
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Brief for Texas Public Policy Foundation Supporting Respondents on the Individual
Mandate at 37, Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398).
64. See MILA KOFMAN & KAREN POLLITZ, GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY INST.,
HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION BY STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A REVIEW OF
CURRENT APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 1 (Apr. 2006), available at
http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/HealthInsuranceReportKofmanandPollitz-95.pdf.
65. See id.
66. For further discussion on state standards and their variances, see id. at 1-4.
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the Court expanded Congress’s commerce power in insurance
regulation, and how congressional actions limited application of the
commerce power through passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
A. Pre-1945 Common Law Insurance Regulation
With insurance companies operating locally in the 1850s, states
served as the first primary regulators of the insurance industry.67
The insurance industry challenged states’ regulatory authority in
the Supreme Court’s first insurance regulation case, Paul v.
Virginia, in 1868.68 In Paul, the defendant challenged the Common-
wealth’s abilities to regulate the issuance of insurance policies and
to issue penalties for not obtaining a license to engage in the
business of insurance in Virginia.69 The Supreme Court held that
“[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce”
and that Virginia had the authority to regulate insurance.70
Speaking for the majority, Justice Field held that insurance “is not
commerce in the sense of the Constitution, however convenient and
even necessary such insurance may be.”71 As a consequence of the
Court’s validation of state power in Paul, states regulated the
insurance industry for decades. 
With the expansion of commerce powers after the switch in time
in 1937,72 the Supreme Court approved of federal insurance
regulation via the Commerce Clause in 1944. In United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association, the Supreme Court held
that the insurance industry was within reach of Congress’s com-
merce power and allowed the federal government to prevent
67. See Tom Baker, The Case for Federal Regulation of Insurance: Should the Tobin
Project’s Risk Group Care 1, TOBIN PROJECT (2006), http://www.bipac.net/afc/Tom_
Baker_The_Case_for_Federal_Regulation_of_Insurance.pdf; Van R. Mayhall, III, A Brief
Chronicle of Insurance Regulation in the United States, Part I: From De Facto Judicial
Regulation to South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, INS. REG. L. (May 16, 2011),
http://www.insreglaw. com/2011/05/brief-chronicle-of-insurance-regulation.html. 
68. 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
69. See id.
70. See id. 
71. Id. at 177.
72. See generally Stephen Ganter, Did United States v. Lopez Turn Back the Clock on the
Commerce Clause?, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 343, 349-53 (1996) (discussing how the “switch
in time that saved nine” expanded the use of the Commerce Clause).
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insurers from conspiring to fix insurance premium rates.73 Justice
Black held, “No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts
its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We
cannot make an exception of the business of insurance.”74 Through
South-Eastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court approved of
legislative involvement in the insurance industry through the
Commerce Clause.
B. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Its Common Law Progeny
Within one year of South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress passed
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and “restore[d] the supremacy of the
States in the realm of insurance regulation.”75 Congress limited
federal involvement in the insurance industry because South-
Eastern Underwriters, which subjected national insurance compa-
nies to federal laws, was “widely perceived as a threat to state
power to tax and regulate the insurance industry.”76 This encroach-
ment on state powers angered several senators, particularly the bill
leaders, Senators Pat McCarran of New Mexico and Homer
Ferguson of Michigan.77 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act explicitly states that “the continued
regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of
insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of
the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.”78 The
McCarran-Ferguson Act generally allows states to regulate the
business of insurance when the federal government elects not to. 
Limits on congressional ability to regulate the insurance industry
are found in 15 U.S.C. § 1012, which addresses federal laws relating
specifically to insurance.79 This section states that (1) insurance
73. 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944).
74. See id. at 553. 
75. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1993).
76. Id.
77. See Timothy Noah, Busted Trust, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2009, 6:52 PM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/prescriptions/2009/10/busted_trust.html.
78. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006) (emphasis added).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006).
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companies are subject to state regulatory laws and (2) Congress may
not supersede state law regulating insurance “unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance.”80 Even when
federal regulation is considered constitutional under the Commerce
Clause, as was the case in South-Eastern Underwriters, federal
regulation is only statutorily permissible if it regulates the business
of insurance. The “business of insurance” is the Act’s most impor-
tant phrase in this analysis because it determines whether Congress
has the right to regulate medical loss ratios. The McCarran-
Ferguson Act does not define what constitutes the business of
insurance, and the courts have struggled with defining the phrase
for years.81
C. The Common Law Struggle with the “Business of Insurance”
Defining what constitutes the “business of insurance” for
regulatory purposes has been left to the courts. Many cases have
held that the intent of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to protect
the ability of the states to regulate82 by limiting federal preemption
of state insurance regulation through the Commerce Clause.83 Most
importantly, courts have held that not all business decisions by an
insurance company are included in the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s
meaning of “the business of insurance.”84 
The leading case defining the business of insurance is Group Life
& Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.85 In Royal Drug, a Texas
insurance company contracted with a group of pharmacies to offer
low cost prescription drugs to its insurance policyholders, while
offering more expensive drugs to its policyholders when purchased
from nonparticipating pharmacies.86 Owners of nonparticipating
pharmacies sued the insurance company for violating antitrust laws
80. See id. (emphasis added).
81. See Robert P. Rothman, The Definition of “Business of Insurance” Under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act After Royal Drug, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1476-77 (1980) (discussing
inconsistent decisions regarding the “business of insurance” across multiple courts).
82. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1979).
83. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427-28 (2003).
84. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216-17.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 207-08.
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under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that the pharma-
ceutical agreement did not constitute a practice involved in the
business of insurance and the insurance company was subject to
antitrust laws.87 
Royal Drug held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not intend
to include every business decision of insurance companies.88 The
Court stated that including all business decisions of insurance
companies “would be plainly contrary to the language of this
chapter” because the “business of insurance” does not include all of
the “business of insurance companies.”89 Royal Drug went on to hold
that practices beyond the “business of insurance” are not included
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, even if policyholders are benefited
from the insurance company’s improved financial condition.90 
The Court used a three-prong test to determine whether a
practice is the “business of insurance,” and thus whether the federal
government can regulate a particular insurance industry practice.91
This test asks:
First, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is
an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance industry.92
Courts must evaluate all of these factors, but do not need to find
that all of the factors are met.93 This three-prong test is known as
the McCarran-Ferguson Act test, and must be applied to all federal
insurance regulations allowed under the Commerce Clause.
87. See id. at 231-33. Although antitrust laws are not at issue in this Note, Royal Drug’s
“business of insurance” rationale applies to the analysis of whether the federal government
may preempt state medical loss ratio regulations. For a discussion of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act’s impact on antitrust law, see Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The
McCarran-Ferguson Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81 (1983).
88. See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 213-14.
89. See id. at 217.
90. See id. at 250-51.
91. See id. at 217-28. 
92. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (original emphasis
omitted) (summarizing Royal Drug’s three-prong test).
93. See id.
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D. Roadmap for Testing the Legality of the Federal Medical Loss
Ratio
To summarize, the McCarran-Ferguson Act and its resulting
common law interpretation expressly limit congressional authority
to regulate the insurance industry. The Supreme Court held in
South-Eastern Underwriters that Congress possessed the right to
regulate the insurance industry if it fell within the bounds of the
Commerce Clause. However, Congress chose to limit its constitu-
tional authority through the McCarran-Ferguson Act by narrowing
the scope of federal regulatory power over the insurance industry to
the “business of insurance.” Since passage of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, courts have fashioned the three-prong test cited above
to determine whether a particular regulated activity constitutes the
“business of insurance.” 
This complex history of federal regulation provides a roadmap for
determining whether the federal medical loss ratio may be consid-
ered legally permissible. The following two Parts evaluate the
legality of the federal medical loss ratio under both the Commerce
Clause and the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Part III finds that the
federal medical loss ratio meets the constitutional requirements of
the Commerce Clause.94 Part IV concludes that the federal medical
loss ratio does not pass the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s three-prong
test, and thus is not statutorily permissible.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAL LOSS RATIO
UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The first step to determine whether Congress is permitted to
regulate medical loss ratios within the insurance industry is to
evaluate whether such regulation is permissible under the Com-
merce Clause. Congress traditionally may regulate any commerce,
94. Although Congress may regulate the insurance industry under the Commerce Clause,
the federal medical loss ratio still must be evaluated to determine whether it meets the
requirements of the Commerce Clause. For example, the individual mandate was not
constitutional under the Commerce Clause in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The commerce power may be used to regulate insurance,
but that does not make all insurance regulation permissible without meeting the Commerce
Clause’s requirements. 
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including insurance, under three classes of cases. First, Congress
may regulate channels of interstate commerce, such as highways,
waterways, and railroads.95 Second, Congress may regulate
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons, goods, or
things that move in interstate commerce.96 Third, Congress may
regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce.97 Cases in this third class apply the “substantial effects”
test.98 
Chief Justice Roberts readily admitted in his opinion in National
Federation that “[t]he path of our Commerce Clause decisions has
not always run smooth.”99 As a consequence of the inconsistent
nature of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause rulings, it is
sometimes unclear how the Court will rule.100 Despite inconsistent
holdings, the Court always uses one of the three classes of cases
noted above to define the scope of activities that Congress is
permitted to regulate under the Commerce Clause. 
Congress’s attempt to regulate the insurance industry by
establishing a federal medical loss ratio may be constitutional under
either the second or third classes of Commerce Clause cases. The
following two sections analyze whether the medical loss ratio is
constitutional under each of these two classes of cases. The first
section addresses the constitutionality of the federal medical loss
ratio under the second class of commerce cases—cases that involve
persons, goods, or things that move in interstate commerce. The
second section addresses the constitutionality of the federal medical
loss ratio under the third class of commerce cases—cases that
involve the substantial effects test. 
95. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351, 358-59 (1914).
96. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255-57 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964).
97. For cases discussing activities that have an economic effect, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 17-18, 26-27 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-25 (1942); and United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-20 (1941). For cases evaluating activity that has a noneconomic
effect, see Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 35-37; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616-18 (2000);
and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-65 (1995). 
98. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2586-89.
99. Id. at 2585.
100. See Colin Starger, A Visual Guide to NFIB v. Sebelius: Competing Commerce Clause
Opinion Lines 1789-2012, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 316, http://www.cardozolawreview.
com/content/denovo/starger_2012_316.pdf.
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A. Constitutionality Under the Test for Persons, Goods, or Things
that Move in Interstate Commerce
Congress may be able to establish its power to impose a federal
medical loss ratio through the line of Commerce Clause cases that
deals with persons, goods, or things that move through interstate
commerce. In order to determine whether a regulation is constitu-
tional under the second class of Commerce Clause cases, the Court
must determine whether (1) the person, good, or thing moved
through interstate commerce and (2) whether the regulation meets
the rational basis test.101 The Supreme Court has repeatedly re-
established this test as the standard for evaluating whether a law
constitutionally regulates persons, goods, or things moving through
interstate commerce.102
Two of the most well-known and frequently cited cases establish-
ing this rule are Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States and
Katzenbach v. McClung. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Congress used
the Commerce Clause to prohibit discrimination at hotels.103
Congress justified its use of the Commerce Clause based on the
movement of people through interstate commerce and the impact of
discriminatory lodging practices on interstate travelers.104 The
Court stated that “the determinative test of the exercise of power by
the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the
activity sought to be regulated is commerce which concerns more
states than one and has a real and substantial relation to the
national interest.”105 
In applying the second half of this test, commonly known as the
rational basis test, the Court asked two questions: (1) whether a
rational relationship existed between the regulation’s purpose and
its means, and (2) whether the regulation supported a legitimate
government purpose.106 The Court similarly employed the Heart of
Atlanta Motel’s test in Katzenbach to prohibit discrimination in
101. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 255-57; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301.
102. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (“Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”). 
103. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 255.
104. See id. at 255-56.
105. See id. at 255 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
106. See id. at 258.
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restaurants.107 In Katzenbach, the Court justified Congress’s use of
the Commerce Clause based on the restaurant’s purchase of food
from out of state that traveled in interstate commerce.108 In sum,
Congress needs only a rational basis to regulate the movement of
people, goods, or things through interstate commerce. 
The following three subsections apply this well-established test
to determine whether Congress may regulate medical loss ratios
under this second class of commerce cases. The first subsection
evaluates whether the federal medical loss ratio is subject to federal
regulation under the class of cases that deals with goods or things
that move through interstate commerce. The next two subsections
analyze the federal medical loss ratio under the rational basis test,
first by evaluating whether there is a rational relationship between
the ratio’s purpose and its means, and second by determining
whether the ratio has a legitimate government purpose. 
1. Persons, Goods, or Things that Move in Interstate Commerce
Congress’s regulation of medical loss ratios meets the Commerce
Clause’s first requirement that the regulated good or thing move in
interstate commerce.109 The regulated thing for the purpose of
analyzing the constitutionality of the federal medical loss ratio is
the insurance premium. Interstate commerce is impacted by the
transfer of premiums between the insurance company, the insured,
and eventually medical service providers, all of whom are often in
different states. Alternatively, the Commerce Clause requirement
is met by the involvement of medical goods, such as medical
equipment and prescription drugs, purchased by premiums that
cross state lines between insurance companies, health care provid-
ers, and the insured.
Two cases aptly demonstrate by analogy how the federal medical
loss ratio regulates goods or things that move through interstate
commerce. In Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, the Court held that
Congress could regulate “substantial commercial loan transactions”
secured by things moving through interstate commerce because
107. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964).
108. See id.
109. See 15 C.J.S. Commerce § 23 (2012).
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Congress has the ability to regulate purchased things that have
moved through interstate commerce.110 In Katzenbach v. McClung,
the Court held that food purchased by a restaurant out of state
qualified as goods moving through interstate commerce as well.111
Insurance premiums and medical purchases are goods or things
similar to the loan payments in Citizens Bank and the foodstuffs in
Katzenbach. Specifically, regulating insurance premiums that
purchase medical goods analogizes to the similar monetary transac-
tion of commercial loans secured by goods in Citizens Bank. Because
medical goods are purchased with health insurance premiums and
such goods cross state lines, they impact interstate commerce. 
In addition to the federal medical loss ratio regulating goods or
things crossing state lines, these goods or things impact the
interstate market. One of the purposes of the federal medical loss
ratio is to incentivize insurance companies to reduce administrative
costs and premiums.112 The incentive to reduce premiums impacts
how much all Americans may spend when purchasing insurance.
Because this incentive impacts insurance policyholders across state
lines, it impacts interstate commerce. Congressional regulation of
the federal medical loss ratio therefore regulates the commerce of
the insurance industry and meets the first step of this Commerce
Clause analysis. 
Given that Congress’s regulation of medical loss ratios constitutes
regulation of the movement of goods or things through interstate
commerce, federal regulation of medical loss ratios falls within the
commerce power if the federal ratio also meets the rational basis
test. The rational basis test evaluates whether a regulation is
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.113 The
following two subsections evaluate whether there is (1) a rational
relationship between the intended purpose of the statute and its
110. 539 U.S. 52, 57 (2003) (citing Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304-05).
111. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 305.
112. See Rex Huppke, All You Need to Know About Health Insurance Rebates, CHI. TRIB.
(July 23, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-23/business/ct-biz-0723-work-
advice-huppke-20120723_1_health-insurance-insurance-premiums-affordable-care-act;
Medical Loss Ratio, OFFICIAL WEB SITE OF SEN. AL FRANKEN, http://www.franken.senate.gov/
?p=issue&id=136 (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
113. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302 (citing United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110 (1942)).
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means, and (2) whether there is a legitimate government purpose
behind the statute.
2. Rational Relationship of the Rational Basis Test
The second step of this particular Commerce Clause analysis
requires the federal medical loss ratio regulation to pass the
rational basis test.114 The federal medical loss ratio is analyzed first
to determine whether the purpose and means are rationally related,
and second to determine whether it has a legitimate purpose. This
subsection evaluates whether there is a rational relationship.
A law is rationally related if there is a relationship between the
government’s purpose for a law and the government’s means of
achieving this purpose.115 In Railway Express Agency v. New York,
the Supreme Court upheld a city traffic regulation banning
advertisements on trucks because the law was sufficiently related
to the goal of reducing distractions while driving.116 The under-
inclusive fit did not affect the constitutionality of the law because
the law was rationally related to the purpose of improving driving
safety.117 Similarly in New York City Transit v. Beazer, the Supreme
Court upheld a law that prohibited hiring methadone users for the
state transit system with the stated purpose of improving city safety
and efficiency.118 Although the fit of the law was over-inclusive, the
Court once again found the fit sufficient because the restriction was
rationally related to the law’s legitimate government interest.119
These older cases, which stand for the proposition that an over-
or under-inclusive fit generally does not impact a rational basis
review, are still some of the primary cases that serve as precedent
for this issue. For example, in 1997 the majority in Vacco v. Quill
relied on Beazer to uphold a law banning physician-assisted suicide
as constitutional because the distinction between withdrawing
114. See id. at 303-04.
115. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); see also Note, Legislative
Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 123 (1972).
116. See 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949). 
117. See id. at 109 (“We do not sit to weigh evidence on the due process issue in order to
determine whether the regulation is sound or appropriate; nor is it our function to pass
judgment on its wisdom.”).
118. See 440 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1979).
119. See id. at 592 (1979).
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necessary medical treatment and assisting suicide is not so slight so
as to fail rational basis review.120 Relatedly, Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Romer v. Evans in 1996 used Beazer’s reasoning to argue that
excluding homosexuals from marriage by state constitutional
amendment was not unconstitutional just because the fit was
imperfect.121
With regard to the federal medical loss ratio, there is a strong
relationship between the means of instituting the medical loss ratio
requirement and the government’s purpose to incentivize insurance
companies to reduce administrative costs and premiums.122 Senator
Al Franken of Minnesota stated that Minnesota’s minimum medical
loss ratio contributed to decreasing administrative costs of the
State’s nonprofit plans to the lowest in the country.123 Although the
federal medical loss ratio may cause other effects, such as influenc-
ing transparency in insurance companies’ spending124 or reducing
the number of available HSA plans, the purpose of reducing
administrative costs is still rationally related to Congress’s means. 
Critics of the federal medical loss ratio may argue that the ratio
is not rationally related to the purpose of reducing administrative
costs and premiums. There are two potential arguments suggesting
there is no relation. First, the fit between the purpose and the
means could be so poor that the federal medical loss ratio could not
be rationally related to achieving the government’s goals. This
seems improbable, however, based on Senator Franken’s experience
with reducing administrative costs in Minnesota.125 A second
argument could be that the government did not intend to reduce
administrative costs and premiums but actually established the
federal medical loss ratio for another purpose. The success of this
argument also is unlikely, however, because of the low standard
that the government must meet to show a rational basis.126 In FCC
120. 521 U.S. 793, 800-01 (1997).
121. 517 U.S. 620, 642 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. See Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 112; see also Huppke, supra note 112.
123. See Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 112 (stating that these plans spend an average of
ninety-one cents per premium dollar on health services).
124. See id.; see also Huppke, supra note 112.
125. See Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 112.
126. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 297, 303 (1997) (discussing how the rational basis test is applied very leniently
in practice).
364 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:341
v. Beach Communications, Inc., the Supreme Court held that “it is
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legisla-
ture.”127 The Court may find another purpose that rationally relates
to the means used even if the purpose is not clearly expressed by
Congress.128 Beach Communications allows the Supreme Court
leeway to assume that Congress’s intention to reduce administrative
costs is the proper reason, even if the legislative record does not
provide clear support for the proposition.
Based on this analysis, the federal medical loss ratio fulfills the
rational relation requirement and thus meets the first half of the
rational basis test. 
3. Legitimate Government Purpose of the Rational Basis Test
The federal medical loss ratio must have a legitimate government
purpose in order to satisfy the last requirement under the Com-
merce Clause. A legitimate government purpose is defined as a
purpose that benefits the public and debatably works to achieve the
regulation’s goal.129 This purpose does not actually have to be
effective in achieving its goal under the rational basis test.130 
The Supreme Court applied this rationale in Minnesota v.
Cloverleaf Creamery, upholding a state ban on plastic-cased milk for
environmental reasons, which did not stand up to scientific scrutiny,
because the legislature’s legitimate purpose was only required to be
at least empirically debatable.131 Similarly in Western and Southern
Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California, the
Supreme Court held that a questionable retaliatory tax was
rationally related to its purpose because “the courts are not
127. 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
128. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
129. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
130. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (“States are not
required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments. Rather, ‘those
challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by
the governmental decisionmaker.’”) (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
131. See id. at 463-64 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54
(1938)).
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empowered to second-guess the wisdom of state policies.”132 Even
though these cases addressed state laws and not federal law, the
legitimate government purpose analysis applies to any government
action, regardless of whether the law is established at the federal or
state level.133
It follows, based on the case law cited above and the prior
subsection’s discussion of the government’s purpose in establishing
a federal medical loss ratio, that the ratio has a legitimate govern-
ment purpose. Implementing a cost control to address the nationally
recognized problem of rapidly increasing insurance costs is a
legitimate purpose. Even if the federal medical loss ratio does not
lower premiums or administrative costs, the government’s stated
purpose is at least debatably legitimate based on states’ empirical
evidence on medical loss ratios.134 The federal medical loss ratio
therefore passes the rational basis requirement and Congress’s use
of the requirement is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
B. Constitutionality Under the Substantial Effects Test
In the event the Supreme Court holds the federal medical loss
ratio to be unconstitutional under the second class of Commerce
Clause cases involving persons, goods, or things moving in inter-
state commerce, the third class of Commerce Clause cases address-
ing the substantial effects test provides strong support for the
proposition that the ratio is constitutional. Congress may regulate
medical loss ratios under the third class of Commerce Clause cases,
which includes both national and local insurance companies,
because both national and local insurance companies substantially
affect the interstate commerce of the insurance industry.
132. 451 U.S. 648, 668-70 (1981).
133. See generally Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1077-78 (2011) (discussing the rational basis test
and finding that “few government actions have ever been found unconstitutional under this
test”).
134. See Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 112.
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1. Substantial Effects Test
Congress should be able to regulate insurance costs through the
federal medical loss ratio because the business of all insurance
companies, including local insurance companies, substantially
affects interstate commerce. Congress possesses the ability to
regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce.135 This is the test that Chief Justice Roberts applied in
National Federation.136 The substantial effects test is applied in
different ways depending on whether the intrastate activity is
economic in nature. 
If the activity is economic, then the Supreme Court gives broad
authority and deference to congressional use of the Commerce
Clause.137 This approach allows for intrastate economic activity to
be aggregated with similar activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce.138 In Wickard, the Court held that the decision
to grow wheat for personal consumption, “when considered in the
aggregate along with similar decisions of others, would have had a
substantial effect on the interstate market for wheat.”139 According
to Chief Justice Roberts in National Federation, “Wickard has long
been regarded as perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.”140 Although
the Roberts Court may not like the broad range of the commerce
power, Wickard still stands as good law, and the regulation of
aggregated goods that substantially affect interstate commerce
remains within the commerce power. For example, as recently as
2005, the Court in Gonzales v. Raich relied on Wickard to uphold
congressional regulation of marijuana use and production because
135. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941).
136. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-86 (2012) (citing
Darby, 312 U.S. at 118-19).
137. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-25 (1942) (“The power of Congress over
interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.”) (quoting
United States v. Wright Wood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)).
138. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28; see also Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (2012). 
139. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2588; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-29.
140. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2588 (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 2643 (Alito,
J., Kennedy, J., Scalia, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
560 (1995). 
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of its effect on interstate commerce.141 The Court also expanded the
scope of regulable activity to include production, consumption, and
distribution of a good.142 
If the regulated activity is noneconomic, then the Court takes a
strict approach to analyzing the role of the Commerce Clause and
does not allow for aggregation of similar local activities throughout
the country.143 This approach to the substantial effects test does not
apply to the federal medical loss ratio, however, because the medical
loss ratio regulates activity of insurance companies that is economic
in nature.144
Based on the most recent interpretation of the substantial effects
test as applied to economic activity in National Federation, the
federal medical loss ratio fully meets the necessary elements. As
stated previously, the federal medical loss ratio regulates activity
that is economic in nature. In fact, the economic activity at issue
with the federal medical loss ratio may exceed the level of economic
activity in Wickard and Raich. Both Wickard and Raich involved
goods that were not sold on the market, but were instead used only
personally.145 Insurers and insurance policyholders exchange
premiums and medical goods throughout the local and national
insurance market, not just among private individuals for personal
use. 
The federal medical loss ratio certainly substantially affects
interstate commerce as well. The regulated activities in both
Wickard and Raich met the substantial effects test although
involving only a fraction of the U.S. population.146 The number of
personal wheat and marijuana growers is far less than the number
of people and companies participating in the insurance industry.
141. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-22 (2005).
142. See id. at 17-19.
143. See id. at 22 (holding that Congress can regulate if failure to regulate undermines a
broader regulatory scheme); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-19 (2000) (holding
that gender violence that injures commerce is not economic and has no substantial effect);
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600-01 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that possessing guns near schools
does not substantially affect interstate commerce). 
144. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text (explaining medical loss ratio).
145. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19.
146. The large majority of the population presumably is not growing wheat or marijuana
for personal use.
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Approximately 256.2 million Americans were insured in 2010.147
Only 16.3% of Americans were uninsured.148 Aggregated across the
population, the impact of the federal medical loss ratio’s ability to
lower premiums and administrative costs affects a supermajority of
the U.S. population. The federal medical loss ratio and its insurance
rebate requirement meet the substantial effects test.
2. Rational Basis Test
Just as with the persons, goods, or things moving in interstate
commerce analysis presented above, the substantial effects test as
applied under the third class of Commerce Clause cases requires
only that the federal medical loss ratio be rationally related to
achieving a legitimate government purpose.149 Without repeating
the previous analysis, the federal medical loss ratio passes the
rational basis test.150 In short, there is a strong rational relationship
between Congress’s use of a minimum medical loss ratio and its
legitimate purpose of incentivizing insurance companies across the
country to reduce administrative costs and premiums.151 
The federal medical loss ratio is a constitutionally valid regula-
tion under two of the three classes of Commerce Clause cases.
Although the regulation is constitutionally permissible under the
Commerce Clause, this conclusion represents only one of two steps
necessary to determine whether the ratio is legally valid. The
federal medical loss ratio must still be statutorily permissible under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
147. See Emily Smith & Caitlin Stark, By the Numbers: Health Insurance, CNN.COM (June
28, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/27/politics/btn-health-care/index.html.
148. See id. 
149.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2649 (2012) (Alito, J.,
Kennedy, J., Scalia, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1964).
150. See supra notes 112-34 and accompanying text (applying the rational basis standard
to the insurance rebate requirement).
151. See id.
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IV. PERMISSIBILITY OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAL LOSS RATIO UNDER
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
The federal medical loss ratio is statutorily permitted to preempt
state law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act if the practice of setting
medical loss ratios is part of the “business of insurance.” The
practice of setting medical loss ratios involves determining how
much premium revenue an insurer expends on noncare related
expenses. The practice of setting medical loss ratios is considered
part of the “business of insurance” under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act and therefore subject to federal regulation if it (1) transfers or
spreads the policyholder’s risk, (2) is an integral part of the
relationship between the insurance company and the insured
policyholder, and (3) only impacts entities within the insurance
industry.152 This Part explains the elements of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act test and how each element applies to an analysis of
the federal medical loss ratio. This Part ultimately finds that the
federal medical loss ratio is not permissible under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.
A. Elements of the McCarran-Ferguson Act Test in Practice
Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act has only three elements,
application of the test has baffled courts since Congress passed the
statute.153 Royal Drug suggested that the first element, requiring a
152. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982). 
153. The Supreme Court recognized in Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act test can lead to divergent results and established a new two-prong
test for cases involving claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
See 538 U.S. 329, 340-42 (2003). The new test requires only that (1) the state law is directed
at insurers and (2) the state law “substantially affect[s] the risk pooling arrangement between
the insurer and the insured.” Id. at 341-42. This test sidestepped two of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act’s major problems—the difficulty of determining how many of the three elements
needed to be fulfilled and “whether the state law itself or the conduct regulated by that law is
the proper subject to which one applies the McCarran-Ferguson factors.” See id. at 340-41.
The Court made a clean break from applying the three-prong test to ERISA cases because its
“factors were developed in cases that characterized conduct by private actors, not state laws.”
Id. Even if the Court had not limited this two-prong test to ERISA cases, the traditional three-
prong test is still more applicable in this Note because a statutory challenge to the federal
medical loss ratio would be directed at how state laws regulate the medical loss ratio. The
370 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:341
risk transfer, may be the most important, explaining, “The primary
elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwrit-
ing of a policyholder’s risk.”154 Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v.
Pireno, which employed Royal Drug’s test, stated that this first
element involved a transfer of risk between the insurer and the
insured.155 Pireno elaborated that “[t]he transfer of risk from
insured to insurer is effected by means of the contract between the
parties—the insurance policy—and that transfer is complete at the
time that the contract is entered.”156 
The second element requires the practice to be an integral part of
the relationship between the insurer and the insured. This element
is not met if the relationship involves insurance companies’
arrangements and practices with parties that are not the insured.157
Royal Drug held that the practice must involve a direct relationship
between the insurer and the insured.158 Specifically, both Royal
Drug and Pireno stated that the practice must do more than “closely
affect the ‘reliability, interpretation, and enforcement’ of the
[policyholder’s] insurance contract.”159 In sum, this practice must
occur directly between the insurer and the insured. 
The third and final element is that the regulated practice must
address only parties within the insurance industry.160 For example,
the pharmacies’ relationship with the insurance company in Royal
Drug did not meet this third element because agreements with
pharmacies were not within Congress’s intended meaning of the
“business of insurance.”161 In Pireno, the Court held that this
element was not met because the practice of peer reviews involved
chiropractors who were not in the insurance industry.162 The key
point is that the practice subject to regulation must involve parties
that are within the insurance industry. 
conduct itself would not be challenged because states have regulated insurance companies’
conduct through state medical loss ratios for years. 
154. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979).
155. See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 130 (quoting Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211).
156. Id. (citing 9 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 39:53, 39:63 (2d ed. 1962)). 
157. See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 131.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 132 (quoting Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216).
160. See id. at 129.
161. See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 224, 231.
162. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 132.
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1. First Prong
To satisfy the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson Act test, a
practice must involve the transfer or spreading of risk between the
insurance company and the insured. The setting of medical loss
ratios does not appear to involve a transfer or spreading of risk.
Risk is defined as the “uncertainty of a result, happening, or loss
[or] the chance of injury, damage, or loss.”163 As explained in Pireno,
risk transfer for insurance occurs when the policyholder agreement
is finalized.164 A policyholder agreement is finalized when a
policyholder purchases a policy.165 The risk transfer that occurs
upon a policyholder’s purchase of a policy is not altered by future
rebates calculated after the purchase of a policy. Even if Pireno did
not explicitly hold that there can be no risk transfer after the
purchase of a policy, all of the risk that an insurance company
accepts is realized166 by the end of the policy term and there is no
risk transfer remaining to be altered by rebates. 
In employing the federal medical loss ratio, the federal govern-
ment evaluates only whether insurance companies have met the
medical loss ratio upon the conclusion of policyholder agreements.
The federal government’s federal medical loss ratio does not and
cannot involve risk transfer because the government requires
rebates to be paid only after all risk has been realized. With the
expiration of the policy period, all risk has been realized and there
is no risk to transfer.167 The practice of determining the amount of
premium revenue to expend on nonmedical care related
costs—establishing medical loss ratios—has nothing to do with risk
transfer.
One may try to argue that the transfer of money from an
insurance company back to an insured at the end of an insurance
163. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (8th ed. 2004).
164. See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 130. 
165. See id.
166. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1292 (8th ed. 2004) (defining realization as the “[c]onversion
of noncash assets into cash assets”).
167. Insurance companies may not request a rebate from their clients for years in which
they pay out more medical expenses than the medical loss ratio requires. However, insurance
companies may build in higher rates later to recover losses. This further shows that there is
no transfer of risk between the insurer and insured. 
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policy’s term could be a form of risk transfer. For example, the
insured may believe there is less risk in purchasing a policy
because, if the insurance company does not allot its premiums
appropriately to medical expenses, the insured will receive a rebate
for a portion of the premium she paid for her policy. The insured
may therefore view the prospect of purchasing insurance as “less
risky.” However, this argument fails by definition. “Less risk” under
such an argument is mistakenly associated with an insured’s belief
or expectation that she will receive money back if the insurance
company engages in an unfair practice. The “risk” that is the correct
focus of the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is the risk
associated with unknown future health care costs—not a potential
for a premium rebate. The insured has no assurance that she will
receive a rebate at the end of the policy’s term. She could easily pay
the same amount without any rebates for years. More importantly,
the rebate of policy premiums occurs, if at all, after the end of the
policy term when the true risk of unknown future medical expenses
has been realized—and no further risk remains to be transferred. As
a consequence, the counterargument fails by definition. The practice
of establishing a federal medical loss ratio, therefore, fails the first
prong of the McCarran-Ferguson Act test. 
2. Second Prong
The second prong of the McCarran-Ferguson Act test examines
whether the practices sought to be regulated by the insurance
rebate requirement are an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured.168 By definition, “integral”
requires the practice to be necessary or essential to the
relationship.169 The practices sought to be regulated by the federal
medical loss ratio involve determining the amount of premium
revenue to be expended on nonmedical care related costs. 
Determining the amount of premium dollars to be spent on
nonmedical expenses, such as administrative costs, overhead, and
168. See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.
169. See Integral Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integral (last visited Sept. 22, 2013); see also Integral
Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/integral (last visited Sept.
22, 2013).
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profits, is not an integral part of the policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured. The relationship between an insurance
company and its insured consists of the insurance company
providing health insurance to the insured and the insured paying a
premium to the company. The amount of the premium an insurance
company dedicates towards paying for various expenses does not
impact whether the insurance company continues to pay for the
insured’s medical expenses or whether the insured pays her
premium.170 In further support, states have set medical loss ratios
and limited insurance companies’ profits for years without changing
the relationship between insurance companies and their insured.171
Even if insurance companies reduced premium rates, this still
would not impact the exchange of services for premiums that is the
key to this relationship. Regardless of whether an insurance
company limits the amount of premium dollars it spends on
nonmedical expenses, or later issues premium rebates, the funda-
mental insurer-insured relationship remains the same: insuring
health risks and paying for the insured’s medical expenses.
One could argue that any exchange of money between an
insurance company and an insured is integral to the policy relation-
ship. Exchanging money certainly is important, from the perspective
of both the insurance company losing some of its profit and the
insured receiving a rebate of her premium. However, the insurance
company will continue to issue insurance and collect premiums
regardless of whether the federal medical loss ratio exists, and in
170. A Gallup poll measuring the rate of uninsured people in the first half of 2012 supports
this contention. Insurance companies were subject to the federal medical loss ratio’s
requirements as of the summer of 2011. Gallup found that from that point uninsured rates
remained stable both at the state level and nationwide. See In U.S., Uninsured Rate Stable
Across States So Far in 2012, GALLUP, INC. (Aug. 24. 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
156851/uninsured-rate-stable-across-states-far-2012.aspx. The lack of change suggests that
the ratio does not regulate an integral practice.
171. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. The rates of total uninsured per state
do not appear to vary based on state medical loss ratios. The middle thirty states in a national
survey of uninsured rates all fell in a tight range between 11% and 18%. See Health Insurance
Coverage of the Total Population, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2011), http://www.state
healthfacts.org/comparebar.jsp?typ=2&ind=125&cat=3&sub=39&show =156&cha=156&o=a.
For example, New Jersey and New York, which had state medical loss ratios, possessed
uninsured rates of 16% and 14%, respectively. In comparison, Virginia and Idaho, which did
not have state medical loss ratios, possessed similar uninsured rates of 14% and 18%,
respectively. See id.
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almost all cases the insured will continue to purchase insurance
regardless of the ratio. Given that the relationship would continue
in a similar manner regardless of the ratio, it is likely that such an
“exchange of money” argument would fail even the “affecting the
reliability, interpretation, or enforcement of an insurance contract”
standard that was considered and rejected as insufficient to prove
that a practice was an integral part of a policy in Royal Drug and
Pireno.172 As such, an insurer’s practice of determining the amount
of premium revenue to expend on nonmedical care related expenses
does not constitute an integral part of the insurer-insured relation-
ship, and therefore fails the second prong of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act test.
3. Third Prong
The third and final prong of the McCarran-Ferguson Act test
examines whether the practices sought to be regulated by the
federal medical loss ratio are limited to entities within the insur-
ance industry.173 These practices include determining the amount of
premium revenue to be expended on noncare related costs. It is
unclear whether the Supreme Court would hold that the practice of
determining how an insurance company spends its revenue is a
practice limited to entities within the insurance industry. 
The government could argue that the practice of how an insur-
ance company spends its premiums is limited only to insurance
companies. Specifically, the government could contend that
insurance companies make internal decisions on how to spend
premium revenue and do not involve outside parties in the decision-
making process. If this is the case, then the third prong would be
met. However, there is a counterargument that the regulated
practices are not limited to entities within the health insurance
industry and in effect involve health care providers. Insurance
companies’ new practices would require insurance companies to
spend a larger portion of their overall revenues on health care
providers’ services. As seen in Royal Drug, outside parties, such as
172. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 132 (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205, 221 (1979)).
173. See id. at 129. 
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pharmacies and chiropractors, are not considered part of the
insurance industry.174 Additionally, a broader counterargument
could contend that all businesses engage in the practice of how to
spend their revenue and therefore such a practice is not limited to
entities within the insurance industry. 
Because the arguments on both sides of this issue appear
compelling, it is unclear whether the federal medical loss ratio
would pass or fail the third prong of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
test. However, even if the federal medical loss ratio satisfied the
third prong of the McCarran-Ferguson Act test, its failure to pass
the prior two prongs suggests that the Court would not hold the
federal medical loss ratio to be statutorily permissible.
B. State Medical Loss Ratios Cannot Be Statutorily Preempted 
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act analysis, state laws governing
medical loss ratios should be exempt from federal regulation. As
discussed above, the practice of determining the amount of revenue
an insurer will spend on certain types of expenses (i) does not
transfer risk between the insurer and the insured, and (ii) is not an
integral part of the insurer-insured relationship. Without effectuat-
ing a risk transfer or becoming an integral part of the insurer-
insured relationship, the federal medical loss ratio fails the first two
prongs of the McCarran-Ferguson Act analysis. The only prong of
the test that the federal medical loss ratio could arguably meet is
the third prong, which requires that the practice be limited to
entities within the insurance industry. The federal government
would be unable to prove at least two of the three prongs establish-
ing the “business of insurance.” It is therefore very probable that
setting a federal medical loss ratio does not constitute regulation of
the “business of insurance” under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
In sum, Congress’s federal medical loss ratio appears constitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause. However, even though the ratio
is constitutional, it remains statutorily impermissible under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Unless Congress repeals the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, which both the Senate and the House attempted to do
174. See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 231-33.
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in October 2009175 and March 2012,176 respectively, federal regula-
tion of insurance rebate requirements through a medical loss ratio
is statutorily impermissible. As the regulation stands, the policy
implications have a negative impact on the legal community, but
potentially a positive long-term impact on the general populace.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAL LOSS RATIO
The legally impermissible federal medical loss ratio remains
unchallenged and thus good law. The implementation of the ratio
led to insurance companies sending over $1 billion in rebates to 12.8
million Americans during the summer of 2012.177 Congress legis-
lated this significant shift of money from insurers to the insured in
order to lower administrative costs and premiums.178 The impact of
the federal medical loss ratio, however, is heavily debated.
Advocates of the federal medical loss ratio argue that the ratio
benefits consumers. Blake Hutson of Consumers Union, a health
care advocacy nonprofit organization, stated that the federal
medical loss ratio “encourage[s] insurance companies to operate
more efficiently.”179 This push for efficiency is probably necessary
based on a recent report by the Commonwealth Fund, which found
that insurance premiums for families jumped by 50% nationally
from 2003 to 2010. Evidence suggests that the federal medical loss
ratio may be instigating greater efficiency. The Department of
Health and Human Services announced in June 2013 that the
health care law caused more insurance companies to enter the
market, which created greater competition in the industry.180 The
175. See Noah, supra note 77.
176. See House-Passes Bill Proposes Repeal of McCarran-Ferguson Antitrust Exemption for
Health Insurance, NAT’L ASS’N INS. & FIN. ADVISORS (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.naifa.org/
advocacy/GovWatch/2012/20120322_repealmccarranferguson.cfm.
177. Parija Kavilanz, Consumers to Get $1B in Health Insurance Rebates, CNN MONEY
(June 21, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/21/pf/health-care-rebates/index.htm.
178. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
179. Jeffrey Young, Health Care Reform Rebates for Health Insurance Costs Rolling In,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012, 4:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/
16/health-care-reform-rebate_n_1676964.html.
180. See Robert Pear, Health Law is Fostering Competition, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (May
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/health/health-law-is-fostering-competition-
administration-says.html?hp&_r=0.
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Department reported that 77.8 million consumers saved $3.4 billion
in premium payments.181
Evidence from state medical loss ratios seems to support this
argument as well. As previously noted, Minnesota leads the nation
in low administrative costs for nonprofit health care plans182 due to
its medical loss ratio of 82% for large group carriers.183 New Jersey’s
75% medical loss ratio similarly has controlled premiums, with
$11.6 million returned in refunds between 1993 and 2006.184 In
addition to individual consumers, small businesses benefit from
minimum medical loss ratios. For example, 37,000 small businesses
in New York received refunds of $50 million in 2008 alone.185
Beyond being consumer friendly, the PPACA’s medical loss ratio
employs calculations that are more favorable to insurance compa-
nies than many states’ medical loss ratio models. Traditional
medical loss ratios account only for health care claims and premi-
ums.186 The PPACA’s medical loss ratio, however, includes account-
ing for quality improvement expenses and fees for taxes, licensing,
and regulatory issues.187
Critics, on the other hand, counter that the new federal require-
ment will be detrimental to the insurance market. Health insurance
companies argue that the medical loss ratio will not achieve the
intended policy goal. According to a statement by America’s Health
Insurance Plans (AHIP),188 the federal medical loss ratio does not
address the true problem of high medical care costs.189 AHIP argues
that “coverage disruptions and other unintended consequences of
imposing a new arbitrary federal cap on health plan administrative
181. See 80/20 Rule Delivers More Value to Consumers in 2012, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-Reports-and-Other-Resources/
Downloads/2012-medical-loss-ratio-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
182. See Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 112.
183. See MINN. STAT. § 62A.021 (2007).
184. See MEDICAL LOSS RATIOS: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 15, at 2.
185. See id. 
186. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 11, at 2.
187. See id.
188. AHIP is the national trade association for health insurance companies. About Us,
AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS (last visited Sept. 24, 2013, 1:00 AM), http://www.ahip.
org/about/.
189. See Press Release, America’s Health Insurance Plans, AHIP Statement on the Medical
Loss Ratio Requirement (April 26, 2012), http://www.ahip.org/News/Press-Room/2012/AHIP-
Statement-on-the-Medical-Loss-Ratio-Requirement.aspx.
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costs are likely to outweigh any benefit these rebates will provide to
consumers.”190 
Reports by the actuarial firm Milliman support this concern. The
firm found that insurance companies’ solvency may be seriously
harmed due to their inability to “shore up reserves” during successful
years with high profits.191 This may eventually harm policyholders
by decreasing the total number of insurance companies, and thus
providing fewer alternatives. Milliman also found that the detri-
mental impact of the medical loss ratio will be much greater on high
deductible health plans.192 The amicus brief by the HSA Coalition
submitted in support of striking down the PPACA similarly voiced
concerns that high deductible health plans, particularly health
savings accounts, will be negatively impacted by the ratio.193 In
addition to Milliman’s reports, at least one study cited concerns that
rebates will be paid based on simple statistical variation in medical
costs.194 Beyond harm to insurance companies, Senator Tom Coburn
of Oklahoma argues that states will be harmed by destabilized
insurance markets across the country and that policyholders will be
harmed by increased premiums.195
Regardless of whether these rebates are a net positive or
negative, most insurance policyholders will not notice changes from
the regulation in the short term. After the first rebate in the
summer of 2012, individuals received $127 in rebates on average,
190. See id. 
191. See JOHN COOKSON, MILLIMAN, INC., HEALTHCARE REFORM’S MINIMUM MEDICAL LOSS
RATIOS 2 (May 2011), http://publications.milliman.com/publications/healthreform/pdfs/health
care-reform-minimum-medical.pdf.
192. See MILLIMAN, INC., IMPACT OF MEDICAL LOSS RATIO REQUIREMENTS UNDER PPACA
ON HIGH DEDUCTIBLE PLANS/HSAS IN INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP MARKETS (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://www.hsacoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/report-ABAImpactofMedical
LossRatioRequirements.pdf.
193. See Brief for HSA Coalition et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
194. See Scott E. Harrington et al., Medical Loss Ratio Regulation Under the Affordable
Care Act 35 (Oct. 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2180965.
195. See Re-examining PPACA’s Federally-Mandated Medical Loss Ratios, OFFICIAL WEB
SITE OF SEN. TOM COBURN, M.D., http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/rightnow?
ContentRecord_id=8b873136-06e9-4820-8f7b-e9b3828e33a4&ContentType_id=b4672ca4-3
742-49c-bffc-fa099b51c966&Group_id=00380921-99d-40f6-a8e3-470468762340 (last visited
Sept. 22, 2013).
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with the largest rebates being sent to Texas and Florida.196 Only 13
million Americans received these rebates.197 This is only 6.6% of the
195.9 million people who have private insurance.198 Policyholders
most benefited by the rebate were people who individually pur-
chased health insurance, with more than 30% receiving a rebate.199 
However, these are only short term statistics. The policy purpose
of instituting the federal medical loss ratio was to reduce adminis-
trative costs. State statistics supporting this policy are still the most
telling evidence. Further, the Congressional Budget Office recently
released figures showing that the rising costs of health care slowed
significantly in 2012.200 Health care experts do not know what is
causing this slow down,201 but it is possible that the threat and
subsequent implementation of the federal medical loss ratio is
beginning to positively impact the cost of health care. If this health
care cost slowdown is partially attributable to the federal medical
loss ratio, this could be a very effective policy in reducing health
care costs while only having a marginal impact on the multitrillion
dollar insurance industry.202 
Beyond the potentially significant impact on health care costs, the
legal community may be greatly impacted as well. The primary
plaintiffs in a suit against the federal government for establishing
the medical loss ratio are insurance companies and states. Although
insurance organizations such as AHIP and the HSA Coalition have
advocated against the federal medical loss ratio, no lawsuits have
been filed to strike the provision from the PPACA. The cost of
initiating another PPACA lawsuit, especially before a Court which
has already shown some support for the Act, may be too great a
196. See Press Release, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Kaiser Analysis: Estimated
Health Insurance Rebates Under the Health Reform Law Total $1.3 Billion Dollars in 2012
(April 26, 2012), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/hr042612nr.cfm. 
197. See Huppke, supra note 112. 
198. See Smith & Stark, supra note 147. 
199. See Young, supra note 179. 
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burden for an insurance company to bear in comparison to the small
cost of reducing administrative expenses and issuing rebates
amounting only to $1.1 billion per year across the industry.
Considering that health care lobbyists already spent over $100
million in a yearlong campaign against the PPACA prior to the
lawsuit203 and more than $1 billion prior to the passage of legisla-
tion,204 the insurance industry may be gun shy to file another major
lawsuit that would involve campaigning the public, paying legal
fees, and potentially facing another public loss in court. The
significant cost of litigation may prevent the insurance industry
from challenging the federal medical loss ratio. 
States may be the only realistic challengers of the federal medical
loss ratio. If anyone is in a worse position to take on needless
lawsuits than the insurance industry, however, it is state govern-
ments. In the summer of 2012 alone, thirty-one states across the
country attempted to find $55 billion in order to close budget
gaps.205 Over the past four years, there have been more than $540
billion in state budget shortfalls.206 States on the whole are not in a
position to fight this battle and, more importantly, probably would
not want to put up a fight due to the benefits they receive. As
mentioned previously, millions of dollars are coming back into state
economies via rebates to companies.207 As a consequence, states will
not complain about the extra income and most likely will not try to
stop the new revenue with an expensive lawsuit. 
Without a group that has standing, the funds to litigate, and the
motive to proceed in court, the federal medical loss ratio will almost
certainly remain on the books. This is unsettling for legal reasons
beyond the mere fact that the federal medical loss ratio is statuto-
rily impermissible under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Several legal
scholars have found the federal medical loss ratio legally controversial,
203. See Rick Ungar, Busted! Health Insurers Secretly Spent Huge to Defeat Health Care
Reform While Pretending to Support Obamacare, FORBES (June 25, 2012, 8:37 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/06/25/busted-health-insurers-secretly-spent-huge-
to-defeat-health-care-reform-while-pretending-to-support-obamacare/.
204. See Lindsay Renick Mayer et al., Diagnosis: Reform, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS
(June 17, 2009, 5:18 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/06/diagnosis-reform.html. 
205. See Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711.
206. See id. at 2.
207. See MEDICAL LOSS RATIOS: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 15, at 2.
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specifically finding the ratio unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings and Due Process Clauses.208 This Note
addressed the legality of the federal medical loss ratio only under
the Commerce Clause, not under other constitutional frameworks.
However, with the multitude of avenues available to challenge the
federal medical loss ratio, this is a legal question that should be
addressed by the courts. 
Even if the law found a challenger to bring it to the courts,
however, many legal scholars think that the Supreme Court will not
want to hear another PPACA case so soon after National Federa-
tion.209 The federal medical loss ratio may be good law for now, but
it offends the rule of law to permit Congress to promulgate a statute
that may be unconstitutional under the Takings and Due Process
Clauses and statutorily impermissible under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. 
CONCLUSION
The insurance industry is traditionally state regulated. Through
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, the federal government is
empowered to regulate practices involved in the “business of
insurance.” The federal medical loss ratio is a textbook example of
when the federal government oversteps its regulatory powers.
Under the Commerce Clause, the federal medical loss ratio is
arguably a constitutional regulation based on two of the three
applicable classes of Commerce cases: (1) persons, goods, or things
moving in interstate commerce, and (2) intrastate activity substan-
tially affecting interstate commerce. However, although the federal
medical loss ratio may be constitutionally permissible under the
Commerce Clause, the ratio is statutorily impermissible as a result
of Congress’s self-imposed limitations under the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act. 
After only two years, the policy implications of the federal medical
loss ratio are unclear. State evidence suggests that insurance
208. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly research about the
constitutionality of the federal medical loss ratio).
209. See Rick Ungar, The U.S. Supreme Court Allows New Challenge to Obamacare to Go
Forward, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012
/11/26/the-u-s-supreme-court-allows-new-challenge-to-obamacare-to-go-forward/. 
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policyholders benefit from lower administrative costs, but insurance
companies appear adamant that the health insurance industry will
be negatively impacted and insurance market instability will result.
Beyond a legal assessment of the permissibility of the federal
medical loss ratio, policymakers will have to track the effectiveness
of this federal requirement to determine whether it is good policy.
Lawmakers similarly will have to track whether good policy is worth
the cost of bad law.
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